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ANTIREALISM AND THE ROLES OF TRUTH
The position indicated by the term "antirealism" has come to the fore in
philosophical discussion during the last thirty years, largely as a result of the
writings of Michael Dummetl.' Prima facie one would expect an antirealist critique
of realism to comprise two parts: a negative part (as the name indicates) criticising
the realist view, and a positive part setting out a constructive alternative to the realist
position. The tradition starting with Dummett, it is fair to say, has mainly been
concerned with the negative part of antirealism. Here, however, the antirealist
appears to have a large, and definite, disadvantage in his perennial discussion with
the realist, purely in virtue of the chosen label; his position is laid down negatively
in opposition to a prior realist position. Accordingly, the antirealist's campaign will
be fought on a field determined by his opponent, and in terms chosen by him.
Therefore, in this Chapter, I do not take the views of Dummett as my point of
departure, especially since the need for a survey of antirealism from this perspective
has been excellently met by Hale (1997). Furthermore, in a Handbook of
Epistemology, this manner of proceeding (that is, not taking Dummett's views as the
point of departure) is quite appropriate, since one of Dummett's main tenets is the
primacy of the theory of meaning over the theory of knowledge. Instead, I discuss a
number of traditional epistemological notions and theories from an antirealist
standpoint, and I also treat of the early work in modern mathematical intuitionism
that provided the inspiration for much of the current work on semantical antirealism.
Thus the present Chapter can be seen as providing an epistemological and
philosophico-malhematical background to the modern semantical versions of
antirealism.
1. THF·: ROLHS OF TRUTH IN RELATION TO THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH
Dummett famously recasts the debate between realism and idealism as a semantical
dispute concerning the form that a proper theory of meaning has to take, and, in
particular, what role has to be played by the notion of truth in such a theory.
However, independently of these specific Dummettian concerns, it is clear that truth
does have a major semaniical role to play: after Frege and Wittgenstein many hold it
to be a truism that
the meaning of a declarative sentence is given by, or in terms of, its truth-
condition.2
This semantical office, however, is not the only one in which truth has to serve; an
equally important epistemological role for truth is given by a similar truism:
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what is known has to be true.
Finally, a third, metaphysical role of truth, so firmly stressed by Frege in the preface
to his Grundgesetze, is that of making objectivity possible:
really being true is conceptually different from appearing to be true,
that is, the distinction between appearance and reality must be upheld.
In view of their truistic character, an account of truth, meaning and knowledge that
respects these platitudes is, ceteris paribus, preferable to an account that does not,
and one would certainly expect a correct account to throw light on why the maxims
in question have been considered truistic.
The epistemological tradition knows various so called theories of truth. What
these traditional theories offer are general conceptions of truth; in the modern jargon
they are theories of truth, that is, of, or about, the concept of truth, but they are not
(Tarskian) truth theories that tell us under what condition the sentences of a certain
language are true. These general conceptions of truth turn out to be admirably
geared towards various offices as given by the above truisms. Thus, for instance, the
evidence theory of truth, according to which what is true is what can be made
evident (that is, known), caters very well for the epistemological role.' Indeed, on
this evidence-theoretical reading the rnaxim
what is known has to be true
becomes
what is known (what has been justified, warranted, made evident, etc.) has to be
true (justifiable, warrantable, evidenceable, knowable, etc.),
and this is a priori obvious from the ab esse ad posse principle: what has already
been done is certainly doable.4
Similarly, the traditional correspondence theory considers certain truth-bearers, be
they judgements in the mind, or declarative sentences in the language, or
propositions in the third realm of abstract entities, and relates these to appropriate
truth-makers in the world:
a truth-bearer is true if a corresponding truth-maker exists.
When the truth-bearers are sentences, this maxim provides just the sort of language-
world link required for the semantical role of truth.
Finally, the metaphysical role of truth is catered for by the pragmatic and coherence
theories of truth. The main task for the notion of truth when serving in this office
(and perhaps even in general) is to hold open the possibility of making mistakes, that
is, to rule out epistemological nihilism, by which I mean an epistemological
counterpart to moral nihilism. This ethical position is characterised by the maxim
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'If God is dead, everything is permitted'."1
The (contraposition of the) corresponding epistemological maxim is
'If mistakes are possible, then there is a norm of Tightness'.
Another way of characterising epistemological nihilism is via the Homo mensura
thesis of Protagoras:
Man is the measure of things.
If that be so, there is no difference between how things-seem-for-me and how they
are, and mistakes are accordingly ruled out. The normative notion of Tightness
allows for an absolute distinction between appearance and reality and makes room
for mistakes: a mistake is an act of knowledge that is not right. It is at issue in
examples such as
I thought that he was a friend, but he turned out not to be a true friend.
In the Netherlands there is butter (known elsewhere as margarine) and real (or
true)'Y rram" butter.
For many years Kummer's "proof or the Four Colour Theorem was accepted,
but in the end it was rejected as invalid. It was not a true proof.
This type of truth - "truth of things" - is known in scholastic philosophy as
rectitudo.6 Now, when a mistake is discovered, or suspected, at least one act of
knowing (that is, of getting to know) cannot be right. Accordingly, one act, at least,
will have to be annulled. The coherence and pragmatist theories of truth provide
criteria for how to choose among the candidates for annulment: clearly an
epistemological act that issues in a result that does not cohere with the body of
knowledge is a strong candidate for annulment. Similarly, deeds with results that do
not work, or are otherwise of no use, will be annulled. The above discussion can be
summarised in a schema:
TRADITIONAL TRUTH THEORIES AND THE ROLES OF TRUTH
Correspondence Theory semantical
Truth according to the Evidence Theory caters for the epistemological role of truth
Coherence and Pragmatic Theories metaphysical
2. ACTS AND OBJECTS
In his characterisation of the realism/idealism ("antirealism") debate Fichte noted
that basically there are only two epistemological options.7 The positions may be
formulated in terms of the act/object dichotomy:
440 GÖRAN SUNDHOLM
act
object
Either you determine the object of knowledge as the object of the act, and then you
are an idealist, or you determine the act in terms of a prior object towards which the
act is directed, and then you are a realist (or "dogmatist", as Fichte said, being an
idealist himself).8 If Fichte is right in this (and I suspect he is), the point is moot
whether there is a neutral background position from which the issue between the
realists and idealists can be adjudicated. For Fichte, it is clear that there is not. If this
be so, it would serve to explain why the realism/idealism debate so often makes a
futile impression; in place of a clear-cut decision, we find endless refinements of
positions into sterile scholasticism, and conversions from one side to the other rarely
take place. Brentano, Husserl, and Putnam are examples that spring to mind, all of
whom came to reject their original realist stance.9 Moore and Russell, on the other
hand, it is well-known, converted to realism from a prior adherence to British
idealism.
It should be noted that, traditionally, the act through which we gain knowledge
can be either mediate or immediate. The object of an immediate act is intuitive, or
non-discursive, knowledge, that is, an axiom, but not in the current Hilbertian
hypothetico-deductive sense: the axiomatic objects of immediate acts are self-
evident truths, which neither need nor are capable of further demonstration. The
axiom is evident in itself: knowledge of its terms and composition suffices for
knowing its truth. In the scholastic terminology the axiom is a propositio per se
nota, whose evidence is ex vi terminorum, that is, in virtue of the terms (concepts)
out of which it is composed.10 'Meaning is what essence becomes when it is
divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word', quips Quine. Hence,
after the so called linguistic turn, one often says that axioms are analytic, in the
sense that they are 'true by virtue of meaning and independently of fact'.11 In fact,
owing to a prevalent conventionalist view of meaning, axioms are even held to be
conventions.
A mediate act of knowledge, on the other hand, is nothing but an act of inference
in which one draws the conclusion J from the known premises J], ..., J^. This act
thus makes use of the mode of inference I:
J] h ··· Jkj.12
The appropriate notion of correctness for such (modes of) inference is that of
validity. A mediate act of knowledge according to the mode of inference I takes the
form (where the J ], ..., J^ are the objects of prior acts of knowledge):
h j.
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This disambiguation between the two readings of 'inference', namely, mediate act
of judgement versus mode of inference, raises the question of the relation between
the corresponding notions of correctness: acts of inference have to be right, whereas
inference-modes have to be valid. How, if at all, do these notions relate to each
other? Clearly, in a right mediate act of knowing, every axiom used must be really
(truly) evident, and every inference-mode that has been applied must be really valid.
Thus, the task remains of elucidating the validity of inferences. Below I shall treat of
both realist and anti-realist criteria for inferential validity.
In the present Chapter I intend to explore antirealism from this act/object
perspective. 1 shall canvas a series of positions and pay attention to the above
truisms on truth, as well as to the traditional theories of truth and their proper place,
if any, within the particular anti-realist framework that I am concerned to develop
here. Throughout I am indebted to the example offered by Per Martin-Löf in the
philosophical explanations of his constructive theory of types." Taken together they
constitute the only substantial anti-realist theory of meaning that has been developed
so far.
3. TRUTH-BEARERS AND THE FORM OF JUDGEMENT.
A knowledge claim is commonly made through an assertion, that is, an assertoric
utterance of a declarative sentence. For instance, by uttering the declarative
(1) Snow is white
asserlorieally, I assert that snow is white. An assertoric utterance of (1) makes no
explicit knowledge claim, but the assertion made, nevertheless, comprises an
implicit such claim. This can be seen from the fact that one is entitled to counter an
assertion with a demand for the grounds upon which the assertion rests: once the
assertion has been made, the "asserter" is obliged, when challenged, to provide
answers to counter-questions such as
(2) How do you know this?
How do you know that snow is white?
Thus, incorporating the implicit claim to knowledge, the explicit form of the
assertion made through an (assertoric) utterance of the declarative (1) is
(3) I know that snow is white.14
The assertion by means of ( 1 ), when understood in the sense of (3), might be called
a performative knowledge claim, as opposed to a propositional one."
An utterance of the declarative ( 1 ) suffices to effect the assertion that snow is white,
but an utterance, on the other hand, of the propositional nominalization
(4) that snow is white
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does not so suffice. In order to obtain an expression with which the assertion in
question can be effected through a single assertoric utterance, however, it is enough
to augment (4) into
(5) that snow is white is true
or, equivalently,
(6) it is true that snow is white.16
If the knowledge claim (3) is spelled out one obtains
(7) I know that it is true that snow is white
as the fully explicit form of the assertion made through an assertoric utterance of the
declarative (1).
In this assertion, truth is ascribed to the propositional content given by (4). The
declarative sentence expresses a statement of the form "truth ascribed to
propositional content".17 In the scholastic tradition, assertion is the external form of
the interior act of judgement, and the assertion is the outward sign of the mental
judgement made. The traditional form of judgement/assertion was
SisP,
that is, a two-term judgement of subject/copula/predicate form. The above tale, from
(1) to (7), provides a reason for abandoning the traditional form of judgement in
favour of
A is true,
where A is a proposition, that is, equivalently, in favour of the form
that S is true,
where S is a declarative sentence.
It should be noted that my above route to the novel form is not the one that was
actually taken by the logical pioneers, to wit Bolzano, who introduced the new form,
and Frege, who reached the same conclusion: Ein Urteil ist mir nicht das bloße
Fassen eines Gedanken, sondern die Anerkennung seiner Wahrheit. '8
In the light of the above discussion the following picture emerges with respect to the
act of knowledge:
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THE REALIST (BOLZANO-FREGE) THEORY
{content of object} <— act of knowledge
4
[{Proposition A} is true]
T
[object of the act J
= [asserted statement], [judgement known]
There are three interrelated levels in this schema:
(i) The assertoric/judgemental act or deed;
(ii) the statement used in the assertion/judgement ;
(iii) the propositional content of the statement.
To each of the three notions there corresponds a suitable correctness notion, to wit:
the Tightness (validity) of the act;
the correctness of the object of the act, that is, the
asserted statement;
the truth of the propositional content of the asserted
statement .
Our task is now to determine the relative order of priority of these notions within the
realist respectively antirealist positions.
The notion (i') is the most fundamental; it is required in order to avoid
epistemological nihilism. Without the notion of rightness applied to our deeds there
is no way to differentiate between appearance and reality, between Schein und Sein'.
the distinction between right and right-for-me is abolished and anything goes. There
are various options as to how to secure the norm of rightness in question. One that
was followed by Bolzano (and also by Frege) is to take the classical - bivalent -
truth of propositions as primitive: every proposition is true or false without further
ado. One then readily explains the correctness of a statement in the following way:
the statement that ascribes truth to a proposition is correct if the propositional
content really is true, and the act of judgement is right if the (statement-)object is
correct, that is, if the proposition that serves as content of the judgement made really
is true. This radical and straightforward reduction of the rightness of acts, and of the
correctness of judgements made, to the truth of propositions imposes a pleasing
simplicity on the resulting realist epistemology.1"
The Bolzano-Frege realist reduction makes all three notions of correctness
subservient to propositional truth: the notion of truth that is applied to propositional
contents then serves in all the offices of truth. The offices of truth, however, match
the traditional theories of truth. Thus, under the realist reduction (whether tacit or
explicit), with its conflation of the offices of truth, the traditional theories are turned
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into rival conceptions of truth for propositions: suddenly they are held to concern the
same notion and impute different, and even contradictory, properties thereto.
For some realists the above epistemological reduction to propositional truth is not
enough. Some, among whom Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, go even further and
apply yet another reduction: the truth of a(n elementary) proposition A is reduced to
the obtaining of a certain ontological state of affairs S^, such that A is true if and
only if S^ obtains. Through this reduction the desired epistemological notion of
Tightness is reduced to an ontological notion, namely that of the obtaining of states
of affairs, which is then often thought of in a bivalent way: either the state in
question does obtain or it does not. Tertium non datur.
The same pattern is obtained in modern versions of these views on knowledge
and language, where a Tarskian model-theoretic semantics is applied to ordinary, or
philosophical, discourse, and where the world is seen (often tacitly) as a (huge)
relational structure in which every sequence of entities either does satisfy or does
not satisfy a given "open sentence".20 In such a way, then, via a realist semantics, be
it Tarskian or not, an ontological norm of Tightness is secured that suffices to avoid
epistemological nihilism.
WITTGENSTEIN'S ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION IN THE TRACTATUS
(content of object}
I
«—act of knowledge
SA obtains [{Proposition A} is true]
^—7
T t
State of affairs [object of the act ]
= [asserted statement, statement known]
4. PROPOSITIONS AND TRUTH
The objects of the acts of assertion/judgement, that is the asserted
statements/judgements made, ascribe truth to propositional contents, which can be
rendered linguistically as that-clause nominalizations of declaratives. In order to
complete the analysis, the notion of a proposition must be elucidated. Such an
elucidation will contribute to both the negative and positive parts of the antirealist
programme. The positive contribution, naturally enough, consists in a constructivist
account of propositions, whereas the negative rests on the intuitionist criticism of
non-constructive reasoning within mathematics.
This criticism was first voiced by Kronecker, who objected to the use of
definitions by means of "undecidable", or perhaps better, as yet undecided cases.
For certain number terms such definitions lead to computations that cannot be
executed to a value in primitive, non-defined form. Consider the following example:
fflO =def
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leN, if Goldbach's Conjecture is true,
OeN, if Goldbach's Conjecture is false.21
445
This is meant to be a definition of a function f:N—>N, but no values can be
computed. For instance, according to the definition, f(23)eN, but we cannot indicate
a natural number k such that f(23)=k.22 Thus this "definition" by undecided cases
introduces defined number terms, which cannot be eliminated in favour of terms in
primitive notation. Such "definitions" allow for definitional equalities in which the
defmiendum cannot effectiveiy be replaced by the definiens, thereby contravening
the canons on definition that have been upheld ever since Pascal.23
The classical logical theory of Bolzano and Frege is bivalent: every proposition
is true or false; in fact, being true-or-false. in the classical theory, is a characterising
mark of propositions. But something is true-or-false only if it is true or if it is false,
or so it is said. The need for every declarative to have a truth-value poses severe
problems, for instance in connections with the quantifiers. Frege's explanation of the
universal quantifier runs (where 1 have only made explicit the dependence on the
domain of quantification) as follows:
V-formation:
(Vxe D)A=(Jef
The True, if A[a/x] = The True, for ae D.
The False, otherwise,
where A is a propositional function over the domain D, that is, A is a proposition,
provided that xe D.
When the domain D of quantification is infinite, or "unsurveyable", this
separation of cases cannot be carried out effectively. It is exactly parallel to the
above non-constructive way of attempting to define a function and it gives rise to
similar difficulties: universal quantification, classically construed, introduces non-
primitive means of notation that cannot be eliminated. This, however, is nothing but
a version of Brouwer's (1908) criticism of the unrestrained use of classical logic
within mathematics.·'4 Note here that it is the universal quantifier formation rule that
cannot be made evident on the classical conception of propositions: it simply is not
clear that the universal quantifier takes a classical propositional function with
respect to a domain into a classical proposition.25
Dummett has launched a controversial argument based on the presence of such
"undecidable sentences" in the language (examples being quantification with respect
to infinite domains, the remote past and future, sentience in others, and
counterfactuals). Knowledge of a bivalent truth-condition for such an undecidable
sentence cannot, in the end, Dummett holds, be "manifested", and so bivalent truth
cannot serve as a key-concept in an adequate meaning theory for a sizeable
language.2<1
L
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To my mind the Kronecker-Brouwer rejection of classical bivalence more
convincing, owing to its simplicity: if you want to avail yourself of classical logic
across the whole board, irrespective of subject matter, you have to use defined
expression that cannot be eliminated. Therefore, in a literal sense, the realist does
not know what he is talking about. This, to me, is too high a price to pay. If one
accepts this conclusion, the need for an alternative notion of proposition becomes
obvious. Accordingly it is incumbent upon the constructivist to offer such an
alternative.
5. PROPOSITIONS: THE CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE
The 1920's constitute a period of transition in logical theory.27 The universalist
"Logic as language" paradigm that had been adhered to by the pioneers Frege,
Russell, and Wittgenstein was gradually replaced by the metamathematical "Logic
as calculus" approach that was emerging in the works of, among others, Skolem,
Bernays, and Hubert.28 The novel metamathematical formal languages were, in the
first instance, not meant for proving theorems in, but for proving (meta-)theorems
about. The formal systems of the Grundgesetze and Principia Mathematica, on the
other hand, were formulated as interpreted formal languages and the axioms and
rules of inference had to be made evident under the given meaning explanations.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, in particular, can be seen as a grand attempt to provide a
semantical foundation for Principia Mathematica. The works of Chwistek and
Ramsey simplifying the theory of types also belong to this tradition.29 The early
systems of Church, of Curry, of Quine, and above all, of the mature Lesniewski. all
fall under the Logic-as-language conception. It should be stressed that Heyting's
seminal (1930) also belongs here: the formalization is understood as an interpreted
one, but in that work the basic notions are left largely unexplained. Heyting's
creation, nevertheless, intensified an already confused debate concerning
"Brouwerian logic": was it not really a many-valued logic, using a third truth-
value?30
Heyting (1930a) intervened in this debate, and, to all but few, put an end to the
confusion. What he did was to give an explanation of the basic notions so that his
formal systems became interpreted formal systems, more or less adequate for the
expression of (part of) intuitionistic mathematics. In particular, Heyting articulated
the relevant intuitionist notion of a proposition. From his intuitionist, or, as I prefer,
constructivist, standpoint, a proposition is viewed as a problem (or expectation),
which has to be solved by exhibiting a certain mathematical construction, namely its
proof. His first example used the Euler-Mascheroni constant C:
The mathematical proposition
Euler's constant is rational
expresses the problem (or expectation) of finding a certain construction, namely a
pair of integers p and q such that C = p/q.
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Heyting (1931, 1934) offered alternative formulations in terms of other basic
concepts, and also Kolmogoroff (1932) gave an interesting alternative in terms of
problems (Aufgaben) and their solutions. As Heyting (1958) came to realise, the
various formulations were substantially equivalent. Finally, Howard (1969)
introduced his formulae-as-types notion, which was refined by Martin-Löf (1984)
into propositions-as-sets (of proof-objects).3'
ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIVIST NOTIONS OF A PROPOSITION
Heyting (1934)
Kolmogoroff (1932)
Heyting (1931) (1930)
Howard ( 1969)
Martin-Löf (1984)
Proposition
Problem (task)
Intention (expectation)
Type
Set
proof
solution
fulfilment (realization)
term
element
This notion of proof of a proposition, it must be stressed, is novel with intuitionism:
in the tradition a proof is always of a theorem, that is, what is proved is always at the
level of a judgement. Prior to Heyting, the notion of a proof of a judgemental
content had found no use. Previously, proofs were either proof-acts (through which
one gets to know a theorem) or (what I, following Martin-Löf, shall call) traces of
such acts.12 The novelty is reflected by the apt "proof-object" terminology that was
introduced by Diller and Troelstra (1984). As is by now familiar, the meaning of a
logical constant is explained in terms of how proof-objects may be formed for the
propositions in which the constant in question serves as the main connective. The
information may be presented in the form of "proof-tables" (which, from the point
of view of meaning theory, play the same role as the truth-tables in classical
semantics):
(J-)
(&)
(V)
(3)
Nothing is a proof of J_.
When a is a proof-object for A and b is a proof-object for B.
<a,b> is a proof-object for A&B.
When a is a proof-object for A, i(a) is a proof-object for AvB.
When b is a proof-object for B, j(b) is a proof-object for AvB.
When b is a proof-object for B, provided χ is a proof-object for A,
λχ-b is a proof-object for Az>B.
When b is a proof object of B, provided that xeD,
λχ-b is a proof-object for (Vxe D)P.
When ae D, and when b is a proof-object of B[a/x],
<a,b> is a proof-object for (3xeD)P.??
One should here note the strong similarity between Gentzen's introduction rules in
natural deduction style and these meaning explanations.34 This suggests a necessary
emendation in the reading of Heyting's clauses. What is given here is not a general
formulation of how proof-objects for complex propositions may be formed out of
proof-objects for their parts: these are explanations of how canonical (Brouwer),
direct (Gentzen), primitive proofs may be formed out of parts, in analogy with how
the primitive, or canonical, number terms
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0,s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))),...,
are given by the rules NI
OeN and 36 N
s(a)eN.
However, as we all know, it is also possible to form non-primitive, defined, number
terms, for instance,
The only constraint that is put on the use of such terms is that they admit of
evaluation to a numerical value, that is, a number term in canonical form. Similarly,
the only condition put on the means used for forming (non-canonical) proof-objects
is that they admit of evaluation (or normalization, in the terminology of Prawitz) to
canonical form.35 In particular, in view of the reduction steps used in Prawitz' s
proof-theoretic normalization theorems, the standard elimination rules for the
constructive logical constants are permitted in the formation of (non-canonical)
proof-objects.
Consider, for instance, Prawitz' s so called &-reduction according to which the
derivation
Dl
Ai
D2
A2
A]&A2 (&E2)
reduces to the derivation
D2
In linearized form, where the introduction- and elimination-rules are means for
forming proof-objects, this becomes:
when D j is a derivation of A] and D2 is a derivation of A2, &E2(&I(D|, D2)) =
D2 is a proof of A2.
The analogy with:
when d j is a proof of A ] and d2 i s a proof of A2,
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P2(<d|, U2>) = d2 is a proof of A2,
where P2 is the right-hand projection-operation associated with pair-formation (and
which yields the second component upon application to a pair), should be obvious.
In summary, then, under the proof explanation of the constructive notion of
proposition, to each proposition A there is associated a set (which might turn out to
be empty in case the proposition is false) of proof-objects for A. Truth is then
readily explained by means of a so called truth-maker analysis (with the proof-
objects serving as truth-makers).36
The proposition A is true = there exists a proof of A.
This truth-condition for the proposition A is determined by (i) the proof-condition
for A and (ii) the relevant notion of existence. The kind of existence that is here at
issue is not that of the existential quantifier. The 3-quantifier applies to propositional
functions only, whereas the relation
ri(a. A) =faf a is a proof of the proposition A
is not propositional in nature: we do not explain Π (a, A) by telling how a proof-
object for this would be put together out of parts, owing to an infinite regress of
ever-descending proof-explanations.17 The relevant notion of constructive existence
was made explicit by Hermann Weyl (1921):
I am entitled to claim that there exists an α only after having instantiated ex.38
Here, then, we have a novel form of judgement: when ot is a (general) concept
α exists
is a judgement, the assertion condition of which is given by the rule
a is an ex
«exists.
The construct! vists, though, are not the first to use existence as a form of judgement.
In particular, they were anticipated by Brentano, who used only the two forms of
judgement
α IS ( or exists)
and
α IS NOT (or does not exist).*'
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The four traditional forms of categorical judgement were then reduced to these two
forms. For instance,
All α are β
was reduced to
40An α which is not β does not exist.
When applied in the truth-condition of the proposition A, the constructive notion of
existence yields a formulation of the assertion-condition for the statement that A is
true:
One is entitled to assert that A is true,
only after having constructed a proof-object a for A.
This analysis (which is due to Per Martin-Löf (1994); of the constructive form of
judgement is, it should be noted, in a certain sense an epitome of the work of the
previous century:
FORMS OF JUDGEMENT:
Traditional form:
Bolzano form:
Brentano form:
Truth-maker form:
S is P
proposition A is true.
α exists
there exists a truth-maker for A
Realist truth-maker analysis:
Bestehen of a Sachverhalt
Constructive truth-maker analysis:
there exists a proof of A
which is reducible to
a is a proof of A.
Thus the constructivist truth-maker analysis of
proposition A is true
is obtained by applying the Brentano form of judgement to the concept:
proof (-object) of A.
That form of judgement, that is,
proof(A) exists
is further reduced to an instance of the traditional form of judgement by means of an
application of the constructivist analysis of existence:
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a is (an element of) proof(A).
The constructive notion of propositional truth must not be understood in a modalized
way: 'existence' does not mean 'possibility to find' in the formulation of simple
truth. This can be seen by considering the different types of assumptions that result
from the two notions in question. An assumption that A is true, that is, that a proof-
object for A exists, is what we use in natural deduction when we aim to demonstrate
the truth of a certain implication Ai^B. The use of such an assumption in no way
presupposes that a proof-object for can actually be found; on the contrary, we all
know of true implications with false antecedents. An assumption that A is true is
compatible with the set proof(A) actually being empty.41
An assumption, on the other hand, that a proof-object can be found for A entails
that the set A cannot turn out to be empty. It is instructive to carry out the discussion
in terms of proof-objects, rather than in terms of truth. An assumption that A is true
means considering an assumption of the form
xe A.
Such an assumption can be used to infer, for instance, that Ar>A is true, irrespective
of the actual truth-value of A, by constructing the proof-object
λχ.χ6
For another example, consider a derivation involving the above &-elimination rule:
assume that /. is a proof of A&B. Under this assumption, P2(z) is a proof of B.
Therefore, discharging the assumption that ζ is a proof of A&B,
which judgement holds irrespective of whether the propositions A and Β are actually
true.
The second assumption, that a proof-object can be found for A, assumes that A
really is true, that is, that a proof-object ae A is obtainable. Under this assumption, it
is incoherent that proof( A) turns oui to be empty. An assumption that a proof-object
of A can be found is, according to the explanations offered previously, the same as
an assumption that the statement A is true is demonstrable (knowable), because in
order to know that the proposition A is true, that is, in order to know that proof(A)
exists, 1 must instantiate proof(A) by means of a proof-object. So, if it is
demonstrable that A is true, a proof-object can be found. In order to grasp the
difference we may consider an example. For every natural number k,
P(k) = that k is the number of window-panes in the City Hall of Leyden
is a proposition. Hence, for every keN,
P(k) is true
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is a judgement (in the sense that its assertion-condition is determined). Truth can be
demonstrated, however, only for one P(m) and the proof-object required for the truth
of P(m) can be found as the result of a (tedious) counting-process.
An assumption, now, that P(k) is true may be used in the following way:
"Assume that P(k) is true. The window-cleaning cost in Dutch guilders is 4 times the
number of panes. Therefore, under our assumption, we should reserve 4 χ k :- D. fl.
in our budget. Therefore, the proposition
(Vke N) (that P(k)=>that 4 x k :- D. fl. must be reserved in the budget)
is true. The truth of this proposition is compatible with any number of window
panes.42
The other type of assumption leads to a different situation. "Assume that
P(10.100) really is true. Then 40.400 :- D. fl. is the sum that we must reserve for the
cleaning costs." Any other sum will, under the given circumstances, be off the mark
and will make the budget incorrect.
Demonstrability ("provability") of statements, that is, truth for statements, is a
modal notion, but truth for propositions is not. The matching two types of
assumptions might be characterized as epistemic assumptions that statements are
knowable versus alethic assumptions that propositions are true.
6. CORRECTNESS ("TRUTH") OF JUDGEMENTS.
For Brentano the judgement (statement), rather than the proposition (which notion
he rejects), is the primary truth-bearer. His account of truth is a modal fusion of a
correspondence theory and an evidence-theory of truth:
a judgement is correct (richtig) if it agrees with (or corresponds to) the
judgement that would be made by someone who judges with evidence.43
Above I tied the correspondence notion to the truth of propositions, and I therefore
prefer, following Martin-Löf, to account for the modal and evidence-theoretical
components in a slightly different fashion:
a statement is correct (true) if it can be made with evidence.
The true statements are the evidenceable, knowable, warrantable, justifiable, ... ones.
According to the discussion towards the end of the previous section, the statement
that A is true is correct, that is, demonstrable, when a proof-object for the
proposition A can be found.
Brentano, however, did not just construe judgemental truth according to an
evidence theory. He also wished to locate the norm of Tightness in the notion of
evidence:
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Bei Evidenz ist Irrtum ausgeschlossen. Bei Evidenz ist auch Zweifel ausgeschlossen, aber weder Freiheit
von Irrtum noch Freiheit von Zweifel macht das Urteil zum evidenten Urteil, sondern eine
Eigentümlichkeit, die es als richtig charakterisiert.44
Here he goes to far in my opinion: the criterion of evidence is the Cartesian 'clear
and distinct', but Brentano wishes this to be a criterion not only for evidence but
also for freedom from error. According to him, when something is judged clearly
and distinctly, error is ruled out. However, evidence is what makes us know, and
thus, when evidence is taken to guarantee freedom from error, knowledge is
infallible and error is ruled out. But error can never be ruled out. Hence evidence
must not be conceptually equated with freedom from error. When error is diagnosed,
the reaction will be: 1 thought it was evident, but in reality it was not.
The classical (Bolzano) view, as we saw above in section 3, gains great
simplicity by reducing the correctness of the judgement
•
A is true
to the truth of the propositional content A. When the proposition A is true, Bolzano
says, the judgement in question is correct (richtig), that is, it is a piece of knowledge
(a cognition, an Erkenntnis).^ On this reading, judgements which are, in the apt
terminology of Brentano, blind, that is, unwarranted, are still held to be knowledge,
simply in virtue of having a (classically) true proposition as content. An example
would be a judgement made, completely without warrant, by hazarding a mere guess
as to the number of window-panes in the Leyden City Hall, say, 8548, and hitting
bull's eye by fluke. To my mind, blind knowledge is to high a price to pay for the
Bolzano-reduction of judgemental correctness to propositional truth, since,
opinions divorced from knowledge, are ugly things[.] The best of them are blind. Or do you think that
those who hold some correct opinion without evidence differ appreciably from blind men who go the
right way?4'1
Accordingly, 1 prefer the opposite route, explaining propositional truth as a
particular form of judgement, and the judgemental correctness as evidenceability.
7. VALIDITY OF INFERENCES.
Corresponding blindness phenomena may occur also at the level of inference. Here,
the classical notion of validity is applicable to an inference(-mode) of the form Γ:
A] is true A2 is true Ai, is true
C is true
Such an inference I is valid, or so Bolzano says, when a relation of logical
consequence - eine Ableitbarkeit - obtains between the propositions that serve as
premisses, respectively conclusion, of the inference in question, that is, when the
consequence
A|, A2-..., C
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obtains logically. In this Bolzano was followed by virtually the entire modern
tradition in classical logic. Similar accounts of validity can be found in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as well as in Tarski's (1936) account of logical
consequence, whose current model-theoretic (Tarski-Vaught (1957)) version can be
found in any decent text-book.47 However, also here the price paid for the ensuing
simplicity is high. The key notion in the explanation of the (logical) holding of a
consequence is that of truth under a variation (or truth in a model). A consequence
holds logically if every variation that serves to make all the antecedent propositions
true also makes the consequent proposition true. In fact, a consequence holds if the
corresponding implicational proposition is true, and it holds logically if the
implication is a logical truth. Accordingly, just as the reduction of judgemental
correctness to propositional truth allowed for judgements that were blindly correct,
so does the corresponding reduction of inferential validity to the (logical) holding of
consequences allow for blindly correct inference. We get a similar epistemological
slack between what is theoretically permissible and what is epistemically warranted:
under the Bolzano reduction, the inference may be valid, even though no
epistemological warrant has been offered in order to make the conclusion evident.
Thus, under the classical Bolzano reduction of validity, we could find ourselves in
the position that we knew the premisses of an inference, and, furthermore, that,
unknowingly to us, logical consequence does obtain between the relevant
propositional contents of premisses and conclusion. In such a position one would be
allowed to carry out the inference - because under the Bolzano reduction the
inference is valid - but still we would not know the conclusion. This situation would
be an example of an unknown conclusion that is validly drawn from known
premisses. We would have a (mediate) act of knowledge, in which all the premisses
were known and the inference valid, according to the appropriate, Bolzano-reduced
notion of validity, but which would not make its object evident.
It now remains to offer a constructivist account of validity that does not suffer
from the shortcomings of the Bolzano reduction. The blindness-phenomena that
impugn the Bolzano-reduced notions of validity and (judgemental) correctness have
their origin in the circumstance that propositional truth is not primarily epistemic.
Evidence is conferred upon what is known, namely a certain statement (judgement),
by the act of knowing. In the case of an immediate act, the statement must be
evidenceable from itself: the knowledge is intuitive rather than discursive. In a
mediate act, discursive knowledge is inferred, that is, is drawn as a conclusion, from
certain evident judgements. Thus, what is called for, in a constructivist elucidation
of inferential validity, is not preservation of propositional truth, but transmission of
judgemental evidence from statement(s) to statement. This leads straightforwardly to
a resurrection of the old idea that the validity of an inference resides in the analytic
containment of the conclusion in the premisses. Thus we say that the inference I
h
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is valid when a chain of evidence-preserving steps Σ], Σ·?, . ..,Z
m
 can be given,
which links premisses and conclusion, and where each Zj is either an axiom, that is,
a self-evident (immediate) judgement, or an immediately valid inference, that is, an
inference the evidence-preservingness of which rests in the nature (essence) of the
concepts that are used the inference in question, and which, accordingly, neither is
capable, nor is in need, of further justification in terms of other inferences.48 It is
interesting to note that this notion of validity, in terms of chains of immediate
evidences, crops up now and then, even in modern mathematical logic. Thus Gödel
holds that 'the chain of definitions of the concepts occurring in the theorem together
with certain axioms about the primitive terms forms by itself a proof, i. e., an
unbroken chain of immediate evidences'.4'' Similarly, according to H. B. Curry's
description of the intuitionist position,
'a proof is valid when it is a construction the individual steps of which are immediately evident; no matter
what nues are given, a valid proof can be found which does not conform to them'.
The notion of validity that was discussed above pertains to (modes of) inference.
However, in the quote from Curry, another notion occurs. There, what is at issue is
the notion of a valid proof. We have encountered three notions of proof that have to
be carefully kept apart, namely,
(i)
(ii)
proof(-act)s of certain theorems;
proof(-trace)s of such acts, that is, demonstrations in mathematical
texts;
proof(-object)s of propositions.
The second of these is the natural carrier of the above notion of validity. Proof(-
trace)s are blueprints for, in general, discursive, mediate proof-acts. When a trace is
valid, that is, when all the axioms that occur in the trace are (self-)evident, and all
the inference(-modes) that occur are valid, then an act carried out according to the
trace confers evidence upon its conclusion.
Rightness -rectitudo - is the relevant notion for the level of (proof- and other)
acts as was already noted." It is sut generis and is needed to account for the
possibility of error. Without the notion of Tightness, error would be an empty notion.
Of course, we can also speak of right ptoof-objects. This would yet again be an
application of the notion of Tightness, this time in the form of truth of things:
concerning a judgement of the form
ce proof(A)
the question may arise whether it really is evident and whether c really does belong
to proof(A). Confronted with such a situation, we are perhaps able, after discussion
and evaluation, checking each construction-step that has been used in synthesizing
the putative proof c, to satisfy ourselves that we were not mistaken:
c is a right proof(-object) of A.
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8. ANALYTICITY AND THE GÖDEL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS
Above, axioms were called analytic and the validity of inference was explained in
terms of 'analytic containment' between conclusions and premisses.52 From
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, with its treatment of per se predications, the notion
of analyticity has had a central role in epistemology. Medieval epistemology, for
instance, in Aquinas and Duns Scotus, treats of demonstrative knowledge in terms of
"self-evident" judgements, that is, statements that are knowable in themselves. In
fact, the explanation offered by St. Thomas Aquinas for the notion of a propositio
per se nota is the same as that of Kant for the notion of an analytic judgement:53 An
S-is-P judgement is knowable per se when the predicate P is contained in the
essence (or concept) of the subject S, so that knowledge of the definitions of S and
P, that is, knowledge of their essences, suffices for knowledge of the judgement
itself.54 On the road to Kant, one encounters the trifling propositions of Locke, as
well as the deviant variation that was adhered to by Leibniz, according to whom all
truth is analytic. However, even Leibniz does not fall into the trap of making all of
(analytic) truth knowable per se. Any S-is-P truth has an a priori proof that is
obtained by resolving the terms S and Ρ to their essential constituents. Owing to the
analyticity of the truth in question the resolution has to stop in identities and the
result is a proof when read in the opposite direction. However, only in the case of a
truth of reason is the priori proof a finite one. In the case of a Leibnizian truth of
fact, on the other hand, the process of resolution will, in general, not terminate after
a finite number of steps, whence only the infinite mind of God is capable of taking
in the a priori proof. Hence, according to Leibniz, other means, and not merely
those present in the terms themselves, are required for us finite minds in order to
know such truths of fact.
Martin-Löf ( 1994) notes that his type-theoretical judgements of the two forms
a:a, that is, a is of object of type a,
and, where a and b are both object of type a,
a=b:a, that is, a and b are equal objects of type a,
have the required analytic character. It is enough to have 'a' and 'a' in order to be
able to decide whether a:a (and similarly for judgements of equality. For both kinds
of judgement, the means of decision utilizes evaluation to, and inspection of,
relevant canonical forms). On the other hand, judgements of the form
A is true,
that is, of the form
proof (A) exists,
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are synthetic, since they cannot be known merely from their own formulation, but
demand a construction, or synthetization, of a proof(-object). Thus, the truth of a
mathematical proposition, indeed of 'ein jeder Existentialsatz', is synthetic. On the
other hand, that the proof(-object) is a proof(-object) of what it proves is something
which can, in order to speak with Wittgenstein's Tractatus, be read off analytically
am Symbol allein."
A beautiful feature of Martin-Lof's view is that every synthetic truth is grounded
in an analytic judgement: when a proposition C can be known to be true, that is,
when we can know the judgement
C is true,
we can also know of a certain construction c, such that the judgement
c is a proof of the proposition C
is analytically correct, thai is, can be known mechanically from the symbol alone.
In general, since it is a question of meaning, it is analytic (ex vi terminorum) that
a certain proposition is made true by a certain kind of truth-maker. Whether such a
truth-maker exists, on the other hand, is something that demands amplification
(Erweiterung) of our knowledge, rather than mere elucidation (Erläuterung).
Something of the this sort, of course, holds also for the classical truth-maker
analysis in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. That a proposition (sinnvolle Satz) A is true
cannot be known a priori, but demands comparison with the world; it must be
checked that the presented state of affairs (Sachverhalt) SA does indeed obtain. The
relation between the proposition A and the state of affairs SA that it presents, on the
other hand, is internal. Thus, what a truth-maker is for A is internally determined
from A, whereas the question of the existence of such a truth-maker is a material
one, that is, one that cannot be answered merely from the symbol alone.
In Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as well as for Bolzano, the important notion is not
that of an analytic judgement.56 Instead the notion of a logically true proposition,
which Wittgenstein calls tautology, and Bolzano logically analytic proposition (or
'analytic in the narrow sense'), that is, a proposition which is true, come what may,
independently of what is the case, holds pride of place.57 In the Tractatus
Wittgenstein transfers the demand of per se recognizability from the notion of an
analytic judgement to the notion of a logical truth: it must be possible, by
mechanical calculation on the symbol alone, to determine whether the proposition is
a tautology.ss As noted by Wittgenstein, the decision method offered in the
Tractatus, however, is applicable only in the case of quanti fer-free propositions.50
The undecidability of predicate logic, finally, that was established by Alonzo
Church (1936), made it an illusionary hope that such a method could be found for
the whole of language: in general, the notion of logical truth for propositions
containing multiple generality, that is, occurrences of the quantifier combinations
V3 and 3V, is recursively undecidable. The logic of judgements of the two
categorical forms
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a is an object of type a, respectively, a and b are equal objects of type α
is decidable, whereas the logic of judgements of the form
A is true, that is, proof (A) exists,
is undecidable, in virtue of Church's theorem.
How do matters stand with respect to the other great limitative theorem, namely
Gödel's (1931) Incompleteness Theorem? Let us attempt to transpose the Gödel
theory to the present framework. A system S of rules for generating proof(-objects)
is consistent, if the judgement
tel
can be derived for no term t from the rules of S. Consider now a consistent system S
that comprises a modicum of arithmetic, say, in the form of construction-rules for
proof-objects corresponding to the natural deduction rules
&I, &E,D vl, vE, =>I, =3E, IE, VI, VE, 31, 3E,G Idl, IdE, NI, NE,
The rule Idl for identity (among the elements of the set A) takes the form
_ ae A _
r(a)eId(A,a,a),
and IdE is the corresponding elimination rule. NI, on the other hand, is the
introduction rule that generates the canonical forms of numbers, and NE allows for
proofs by means of mathematical induction over the set N, by means of permitting
the definition of functions by recursion. The work of Gödel, when transposed to the
present framework, shows that, by inspection of the rules of S, we can explicitly
indicate a true proposition G§ of LS such that for no term t of the language LS of the
system S can the judgement
te proof(Gs)
be derived from the rules of S, even though the proposition G$ is formulated using
concepts in LS only. However, the truth of G§ can be demonstrated in a suitable
conservative extension S' of the system S, where a term t' can be found, together
with a demonstration of the judgement
t'e proof(Gs)
from the rules of S'. The true proposition GS is itself arithmetical, that is, formulated
in terms of purely arithmetical concepts, but its proof can be obtained only using
non-arithmetical concepts: the term t' cannot be formed in the language LS of the
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system S, but only in the extended language L§' of the system S'. The Gödel
Incompleteness strikes, not at the complete logic of analytic judgements, but against
the incomplete logic of propositional truths, that is, judgements of the form
proposition A is true.
Let SPROP be the system of propositional truths that is obtained by stripping off the
proof-objects from the theorems of S, that is, by replacing the S theorem
ce proof( A)
by the truncated SPRQP theorem
A is true.
The Gödel theorem then says that, for certain systems S and S', the matching system
of proposilional truths S'PROP w'^ not extend SPROP conservatively, even though
the system S' is a conservative extension of S.60 Gödel shows that the logic of
propositional truth is incomplete. For analytic judgements, on the other hand, where
the proof(-object)s of propositions have not have not been suppressed in the
theorems, completeness does hold. If an analytic judgement J of the form
aea
is formulated in a language L$. one will find a demonstration of J by means of
applying the introduction and elimination rules of proof-construction from the
construction-principles in S backwards.
Here, I think, lies a definite advantage of the constructivist position. In the
Tractaius Wittgenstein rejects in scornful terms any use of 'das Einleuchten' - (self-
)evidencc - in logic.61 He has, however, not taken proper notice of the fact that his
demand that the propositions of logic be mechanically decidable am Symbol allein is
nothing but a variant of the traditional demand that the primitive propositions of
logic be knowable per se, that is, that they can be made evident from themselves and
do not demand an external comparison with the world. Just as Kant's analytic
judgements they offer no extension but only elucidation of our knowledge.
Wittgenstein simulataneously both rejects and imposes this demand for analytical
self-evidence, whence his position becomes impossible. The constructivist
epistemological alternative that I have been concerned to outline in the present
Chapter, on the other hand, suffers no ill fate at the hand of the Incompleteness and
Undecidability theorems, and this, to my mind, constitutes a powerful argument in
its favour.
Goran Sundholm
Leyden University
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NOTES
'See for instance the essays collected in his (1978) and (1993), as well as the synoptic
(1991).
2
 Grundgesetze, I, § 32, respectively Tractatus 4.024. David Wiggins (1980), (1992),
(1997), in particular, has persistently explored the possibilities of this truth-conditional
paradigm.
3
 Evidence is the quality that pertains to what is evident, and it is commonly expressed in
terms of the Cartesian 'clear and distinct'. This evidence of what is evident must he
distinguished from the evidence for an opinion. (The latter notion is not at issue in the present
chapter.) The locus classicus for the evidence theory of truth is Brentano (1930, IV). 'Das
Problem der Evidenz', that is, Stegmüller (1954, Ch. 1.4), is an excellent introduction to the
role of evidence in epistemology. Patzig (1971) is also illuminating, whereas Schlick (1910)
offers a critical exposition.
41 am here indebted to Per Martin-Löf (l 998).
5
 See Olson (1967).
St. Augustine's Soliloquies and St. Anselm's De veritate are the prime sources
concerning the notion of rectitudo.
7
 Fichte (1797).
8
 The act/object dichotomy raises the issue of the corresponding correctness notions: as a
rule I shall reserve right for acts and correct for objects, for example, "the object of a right act
of judgement is correct".
9
 See, respectively, Brentano (1930, Section IV), Patzig (1967), as well as Putnam (1981)
and many later writings.
10
 Duns Scotus (1987, p. 106 and p. 126, respectively). The fascinating scholastic teaching
on these matters is admirably treated by Vier (1951 ).
HQuine(1951,p. 21 and p. 22).
12
 In the German tradition, for instance, in Frege, one finds the distinction between
Schluss (act) and Schlussweise (mode of inference).
13
 See Martin-Löf (1985) and other works listed in its Postscript.
14
 The notion of an assertoric utterance is here the prior one. The assertoric utterances of
declaratives are delineated by means of the criterion involving the legitimacy of the counter-
question (2): inquiry as to how the utterer knows is legitimate after an assertoric utterance and
in other cases not.
15
 The third person prepositional claim Göran Sundholm knows that snow is while is
different from the sense of (3) that is here at issue. In order to understand this, the Moorean
paradoxes which lurk around the corner might be reflected upon: since I might forget, or be
otherwise confused about my identity, an assertion by me of
Snow is white, but Göran Sundholm does not believe it
is not paradoxical, whereas an assertion by me (or anyone else) effected by
means of an assertoric utterance of
Snow is white, but I do not believe it
is. Under the analysis in the text, in both cases, we get the illocutionary
knowledge claim
I know that snow is white,
which, together with,
I do not believe it,
does yield a Moorean paradox. My assertion of
Göran Sundholm does not believe it,
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on the other hand, does not yield a paradox, unless the additional claim that
I know that I am Göran Sundholm
is also given.
16
 In order to avoid offensive iterations of that it is often convenient to use the form (6).
'' Warning. Ever since Cook Wilson the term statement has been overburdened in Oxford
philosophy. My 'statements' do not coincide with Dummett's: his statements come close to
my propositions, but are also intended to take indexicality into account, a topic that I prefer to
leave out of consideration. My use is also different from that of Frege. For Frege, the
declarative expresses a proposition (Gedanke) and this proposition may or may not be
asserted. Given that it is the nominali/ations 'that S' of declaratives S that stand for
propositions, 1 hold that Frege is wrong in this and that propositions are not
behauptungsfähig. On the contrary, it is the statement expressed by the declarative S, namely
the statement that it is true that S, that is capable of being asserted.
l x
 Bolzano (1837, § 34 ). and Frege (1892, p.34, fn. 7).
|y
 Independently of the chosen epistemological position, a mistake is an act of knowledge
which is not right. Under the realist reductions the Tightness of acts of knowledge is reduced
to the correctness of their products and that in turn to the truth of the propositional contents.
But from a realist point of view propositional truth is bivalent: the proposition A either is, or
is not, true, tertium non datur. From the constructivist point of view (which opts for the
opposite alternative in the Fichtean dichotomy and upholds the primacy of acts), on the other
hand, the tightness of acts is primitive, sui generis.
20
 This theme is worked out in some detail in my (1994). Niniluoto (1997) argues against
some of the conclusions I drew there.
21
 The example is taken from Rogers (1967, p. 9-10). It is manufactured for a purpose, but
it is not farfetched. Compare, for instance, the analogous example of Dirichlet, concerning the
characteristic function of the rational numbers within the reals, which is highly significant
from a mathematical point of view.
The use of the set-theoretic e in place of the type theoretic colon : is natural when the
type in question is also a set.
These canons are well set out in Dubislav (1931, §14).
'
4
 1 have learned this way of presenting Brouwer's argument from Aarne Ranta (1994.
Chapter 2.14, pp. 37-38). With the benefit of hindsight I can find it already in Martin-Lof
(1985, p. 33).
There is, of course, nothing special about the universal quantifier: the analogous way of
construing the existential quantifier produces the same quandaries.
See, in particular, 'The philosophical basis of intuitionistic logic' (1975) and 'Wrhat is a
theory of meaning? II' (1976), reprinted respectively in (1978) and (1993). There is, however,
no consensus even as to how, precisely Dummeît's argument goes; a massive scholarly debate
has arisen, to which my (1987) is a relatively early contribution.
27
 The transition is beautifully described by Warren Goldfarb (1979).
2K
 The distinction between the two logical paradigms was introduced by Jean van
Hcijenoort (1967), (1976). Jaakko Hintikka (1996) has tirelessly explored its possibilities.
29
 Godel's (1944) essay for the Schilpp volume on Russell deals with these issues in
considerable depth.
'° Thiel ( 1988) and Franchella ( 1994) survey the debate in question.
''' Detailed arguments concerning the equivalence between the formulations in terms of
propositions that express intentions towards constructions and in terms of problems that
require solutions can he found in my (1983, pp. 158-9). and (1997, p. 196).
32
 The notion of trace is dealt with in considerable detail in my (1993). (1997). (1998) and
(forthcoming).
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33
 These formulations are not taken directly from Heyting, but are inspired by
formulations used by Martin-Lof (1984). A proof of a mathematical theorem (that we can be
found in a certain mathematical text) is such a proof-trace. It can be used as a "blue-print" for
proof-acts by other mathematicians in order to get to know the theorem in question. Other
examples are the scores of chess-games (which can be used by other players to imitate
opening novelties etc.) and, of course, scores of music.
34
 Martin-Löf (1987) discusses the significance of this fact.
35
 See Prawitz (1971, §§ 3.3-3.5), Dummett (1977, Ch. 4), or Tennant (1978, § 4.10,
§5.4).
36
 For further information concerning this truth-maker perspective on the correspondence
theory of truth, see Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984). I have spelled out some
consequences of adopting this perspective to the constructive notion of truth in my (1994).
37
 For which regress, see my (1983, p. 162).
381 have dealt with this notion at some length in (1994a).
39
 Brentano (1956, §27).
40
 Brentano (1956, §30). These reductions were known also to Leibniz and to Bolzano.
Bolzano, however, used his standard form of judgement A is true, and the reductions in terms
of the Gegenständlichkeit einer Vorstellung (exemplification of a concept) were carried out in
the Sätze an sich (propositions) that serve as contents of his judgements.
41
 All "empty" propositions, that is, propositions with no proof-objects are (materially)
equivalent (while false), but they need not be logically equivalent, nor are they identical
propositions. For instance, the (sets of proofs of the) propositions J_ and A&-.A are both
empty. (In this, and some subsequent examples, I find it convenient to identify the proposition
A and the set proof(A), so as not to overburden the notational patience of the reader.) The
propositions are not identical, though. For the propositions A and B to be identical the
inferences from the judgement aeA to the judgement aeB (where a is canonical), and
conversely, must be immediate from the meaning explanations of the propositions in question.
In the example just given, by stipulation _L has no canonical proofs, whereas a canonical proof
of A&—.A has to be an ordered pair <a,b> the first component a of which is a proof of A and
the second component b is a proof of -iA. Clearly, then, these are not identical propositions.
Applying the proefobject b to a one obtains ap(b,a)e_L, which is impossible since, according
to its meaning explanation, J_ has no canonical proofs (and so no proofs at all). For more
discussion, see my (1994b).
42
 For plausibility, and feasibility, the numbers considered should be taken below, say, 10
000.
43
 Brentano (1930, p. 139) and (1956, §42). Note how the standard regress arguments
(Dialellé), e. g. Kant (1800, Ch. VII) and Frege (1918, p. 60), against the correspondence
theory are obviated here by letting the judgement correspond to another judgement.
44
 Brentano (1956, §35, p. 143). (My) English translation:
Error is precluded with evidence. Also doubt is precluded with evidence, but the
judgement is not made evident by freedom from error, or by freedom from doubt, but by a
peculiarity that characterizes it as correct.
45
 WL § 34, 3, a: 'Jedes Urteil enthält einen Satz, der entweder der Wahrheit gemäss ist
oder ihr nicht gemäss ist; und in dem ersten Falle heisset das Urteil ein richtiges, im zweiten
ein unrichtiges.' WL § 36: (Bolzano) 'versteht unter dem Worte Erkenntnis ein jedes Urteil,
das einem wahren Satz enthält.'
46
 Thus Socrates in Plato's Republic, 506c. I am indebted to Per Martin-Löf for drawing
my attention to this splendid passage.
47
 Frege is the only prominent exception to this almost universal acceptance of the
Bolzano-reduction of the validity of an inference between statements to the logical holding of
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a matching consequence-relation between the propositional contents of the statements in
question, cf. Currie (1987).
48
 ί discuss this notion of validity, and its roots in medieval logic, in my (1998) and
(1998a).
49
 (1972, p. 275, fn. h).
NJ
 (1963, p. 10). (On my reading Curry conflates proofs as acts and proofs as objects.) The
final part of the quote attempts to find a place within constructivism for the effects of Gödel's
incompleteness theorem. Martin-Lof (1994) gives an account of Gödel incompleteness for the
constructivist framework, and some details can be found in section 8 below.
51
 See section 1 above.
52
 This section draws heavily on Martin-Lof (1994), and in some measure also on
Sundholm (1990), (forthcoming).
Summa contra Gentiles. Ch. X, and Summa Theologica, QÎI.1, respectively, K.d.r.V.
Bo.
M
 1 am not unaware that several Quinean (1951) bullets are being bitten here.
6.113. Wittgenstein's formulation - am Symbol allein - recalls the scholastic ex vi
tenninorum (or ex terminis). (See footnote 10 above.) in my (1990) the analogy is noted
between
(i) Kan! The judgement S is P is analytic, that is. the predicate P is
contained in the concept of the subject S
(i i ) Wittgenstein P is a formal (or internal) property (feature) of a
(iii) Martin-Lof a:a. that is, a is an object of type α
'
v
' Indeed, the notion of judgement as such gets very short shift in the Tractatus; in 4.442
Frege's Urteilsstrich - in fact the combination of the Urteils- and Intiahs-striche - is
dismissed as being entirely without logical significance.
57
 7'raciaux 4.46, respectively, WL § 148(3).
* 6.11,6.113.
59
 6,1203,
h
" Formal theories in so called standard first order fomalizalion are, from the present
meaning-theoretical perspective, obtained by the step from S to SPROp- In the process of
jettisoning the proof-objects much information is lost. For certain purposes, this is of no
consequence. Sometimes, however, unwanted phenomena arise, such as in case of the Gödel
theorem, where a conservative extension including proof-objects, is changed into a non-
conservative extension by suppressing them.
61
 5.1363. 5.4731,6.1271,
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